

Today
Live from Deadwood
by
TEMS SECURITY SERVICES




Work smarter
Not harder



Some statistics data

- Vienna – Deadwood 8.182,66 km
- Time difference 8 hours
- Population 1.270
- WildWest Hacking Fest Attendees 950
- Closest airport (Rapid City) 67km
- Elevation 1.390 Meter
- No public transportation from the Airport



 Entfernung **Vienna, AUT** → **Deadwood, S...**

Entfernung: 8.182,66 km

Fahrstrecke: --



Kalaallit Nunaat

Vienna, AUT




Deadwood, SD, USA



ENTFERNUNG BERECHNEN!

BULK



WWHF#2023 / Deadwood SD

tems security





tems security

Poll 1:

How much costs this rental car per day?



1. US\$ 40,00
2. US\$ 80,00
3. US\$ 120,00
4. US\$ 160,00





Agenda

- All about the Cloud

General permission by Cloud Provider

- All three big players are allowed without PTA to Pentest Cloud Services.
- Some don't's for Pentester on SaaS Provider:
 - DoS testing
 - Intense fuzzing
 - Phishing the cloud provider's employees
 - Testing other company's assets

MICROSOFT AZURE PENETRATION TESTING NOTIFICATION

As of June 15, 2017, Microsoft no longer requires pre-approval to conduct a penetration test against Azure resources.

Customers who wish to formally document upcoming penetration testing engagements against Microsoft Azure are encouraged to fill out the [Azure Service Penetration Testing Notification form](#). This process is only related to Microsoft Azure, and not applicable to any other Microsoft Cloud Service.

AWS Customer Support Policy for Penetration Testing

AWS customers are welcome to carry out security assessments or penetration tests against their AWS infrastructure without prior approval for 8 services, listed in the next section under "Permitted Services."

Please ensure that these activities are aligned with the policy set out below. Note: Customers are not permitted to conduct any security assessments of AWS infrastructure, or the AWS services themselves. If you discover a security issue within any AWS services in the course of your security assessment, please [contact AWS Security](#) immediately.

My summary



- Service principles can be setup with certs in Azure
- Great Recon tools outside at this moment (will follow up in Webinar 13)
- Everyone can get your Tenant ID with a single command
- Exploiting Misconfigured Cloud Assets
 - S3 Buckets
 - Elastic Block Store (EBS)
 - Microsoft Azure Storage
 - Google Cloud Platform
- Key Disclosure in Public Repositories
- Teams is unsecure per default

Entra ID-Passwords

Everyone can do the follow

- ✓ If a user cred is valid
- ✓ If MFA is enabled on the account
- ✓ If a tenant doesn't exist
- ✓ If a user doesn't exist
- ✓ If the account is locked
- ✓ If the account is disabled
- ✓ If the password is expired

* MSOLSpray is your tool for that

Recon: Global Azure Information

```
PS C:\WINDOWS\system32> Get-MsolCompanyInformation

DisplayName           : Tems Security Services GmbH
PreferredLanguage     : en
Street                : Hosnedlgasse 16
City                  : wien
State                 :
PostalCode            : 01220
Country               :
CountryLetterCode    : DE
TelephoneNumber       :
MarketingNotificationEmails : {}
TechnicalNotificationEmails : {michael.meixner@tems-security.at}
SelfServePasswordResetEnabled : True
UsersPermissionToCreateGroupsEnabled : True
UsersPermissionToCreateLOBAppsEnabled : True
UsersPermissionToReadOtherUsersEnabled : True
UsersPermissionToUserConsentToAppEnabled : True
DirectorySynchronizationEnabled : False
DirSyncServiceAccount :
LastDirSyncTime       :
LastPasswordSyncTime  :
PasswordSynchronizationEnabled : False
```

One of the Conditional Access Pitfall

Device platforms

The device platform is characterized by the operating system that runs on a device. Azure AD identifies the platform by using information provided by the device, **such as user agent strings**. Since user agent strings can be modified, this information is unverified. Device platform should be used in concert with Microsoft Intune device compliance policies or as part of a block statement. The default is to apply to all device platforms.

Azure AD Conditional Access supports the following device platforms:

- Android
- iOS
- Windows Phone
- Windows
- macOS

Second Conditional Access Pitfall (authenticated)

Tools will help to find inconsistencies in Microsoft MFA deployments, only with valid username and password


- Microsoft Graph API
- Azure Service Management API
- Microsoft 365 Exchange Web Services
- Microsoft 365 Web Portal
- Microsoft 365 Web Portal Using a Mobile User Agent
- Microsoft 365 Active Sync
- ADFS

Username & Password from Leaked dataset

```
----- Microsoft 365 Web Portal -----
[*] Authenticating to Microsoft 365 Web Portal...
[*] SUCCESS! smonkey@glitchcloud.com was able to authenticate to the Microsoft
365 Web Portal. Checking MFA now...
[**] It appears MFA is setup for this account to access Microsoft 365 via the
web portal.

----- Microsoft 365 Web Portal w/ Mobile User Agent (Android) -----
-----
[*] Authenticating to Microsoft 365 Web Portal using a mobile user agent...
[*] SUCCESS! smonkey@glitchcloud.com was able to authenticate to the Microsoft
365 Web Portal. Checking MFA now...
[**] It appears there is no MFA for this account.
[***] NOTE: Login with a web browser to https://outlook.office365.com using a
mobile user agent.
```

Device Code Phishing



Microsoft


Enter code

Enter the code displayed on your app or device.

Code

Next

Access token = 1h
Refresh token = 90 days



Microsoft

Sign in

to continue to Microsoft Azure

Email address, phone number or Skype

No account? [Create one!](#)

[Can't access your account?](#)

Next

(not possible to revoke this token)
(Admin or User can revoke this token)



Steal Tokens (1/2)



Google JSON Tokens and
credentials.db



Azure Cloud Service
Packages (.cspkg)



Azure Publish Settings files
(.publishsettings)



Developers often use
storage explorers to easily
upload and download files to
Azure




Storage Explorers store
credentials on disk
(Windows Credential
Manager) and then use
them to authenticate to
services such as Azure



Web Config and App
Config files

Steal Tokens (2/2)



File Explorer path: This PC > Local Disk (C:) > Users > MichaelMeixner > .Azure

Name	Date modified	Type	Size
ErrorRecords	17/10/2023 7:43 pm	File folder	
AzInstallationChecks.json	17/10/2023 7:46 pm	JSON File	1 KB
AzureRmContext.json	18/10/2023 11:42 pm	JSON File	5 KB
AzureRmContextSettings.json	17/10/2023 7:43 pm	JSON File	1 KB
AzureRmSurvey.json	18/10/2023 5:17 pm	JSON File	1 KB
PSConfig.json	17/10/2023 7:43 pm	JSON File	1 KB



context files (.json)

azure\
s

PowerShell command
history is here

```
%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt
```


Hybrid Entra ID Joined Devices

- **Global Administrators** and **Intune Administrators** can execute PowerShell scripts on Hybrid-joined systems
- Use Microsoft's Endpoint Manager to execute
- Scripts get executed on reboot or hourly when a sync occurs



ADConnect DCSync

AAD Connector is a hidden DC and must be protected as your DC too



```
PS C:\Users\ > Get-NetUser -Filter "(samAccountName=MSOL_*)" |Select-Object name,description | fl

name           : MSOL_01_60
description    : Account created by Microsoft Azure Active Directory Connect with installation identifier 018... 1b running on computer DIRSYNCPRD01 configured to synchronize to
tenant        : .onmicrosoft.com. This account must have directory replication permissions in the local Active Directory and write permission on certain attributes to enable Hybrid
Deployment.

name           : MSOL_AD_Sync
description    : Account created by the Microsoft Online Services Directory Synchronization tool to read from Active Directory. This account must have read permissions and directory replication permissions
in the local Active Directory.
```

```
Get-NetUser -Filter "(samAccountName=MSOL_*)" |Select-Object name,description | fl
```

Bloodhound for Azure



BLOODHOUND

<https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/AzureHound>

Entra ID from Hacker point of view (authenticated)

- Clone Groups – (example Administrators)
- Dump Condition access policies
- Dump Dynamic Group Schema
- Users can create APPs per Default
- Find Mailboxes with through settings
- All Users are allowed to create Security Groups in Entire ID
- Block Azure ID access block you only on the GUI but not from the Powershell
- Pillage (plündern)
 - Teams Messages, Teams-Chat, Teams-Files
 - E-Mails
 - SharePoint
- Search for all UserAttributes
- Full Search for Onedrive & Sharepoint with Graph API
- Download files which are blocked to download
- Read Email with touching the Read/unread function in Outlook



https://msportals.io/

Azure IT Admin Portals

Microsoft Azure Portal	https://portal.azure.com • aka.ms B2B
Microsoft Azure <i>Release Candidate</i>	https://rc.portal.azure.com
Microsoft Azure <i>Preview</i>	https://preview.portal.azure.com
Microsoft Entra Admin Center (Formerly Azure AD Admin Center) <i>Identity Management</i>	https://entra.microsoft.com • aka.ms
Create New Tenant / Azure Active Directory	https://account.azure.com/organization
Azure Cloud Shell	https://shell.azure.com
Azure Cosmos DB	https://cosmos.azure.com
Azure Data Factory	https://adf.azure.com
Azure Synapse Analytics	https://web.azuresynapse.net/
Azure Non-profit Portal	https://nonprofit.microsoft.com/#/ngoportal
Azure Resource Explorer	https://resources.azure.com
Azure Resource Explorer <i>Raw</i>	https://resources.azure.com/raw

Azure IT Admin Portals - Sub Portal Links

Azure Authentication methods	https://aad.portal.azure.com/#blade/Microsoft_AAD_...
Azure Backup Center	https://portal.azure.com/#blade/Microsoft_Azure_Da...
Privileged Identity Management	https://portal.azure.com/#blade/Microsoft... • aka.ms
Desktop Analytics Portal	https://devicemanagement.portal.azure.com/#blade/M...
Azure Sentinel	https://portal.azure.com/#blade/Microsoft_Azure_Se...
Azure Universal Print <i>Raw</i>	https://portal.azure.com/#blade/Universal_Print/Ma...


Administrator Portals

Welcome to this community driven project to list all of Microsoft's portals in one place.

Microsoft 365 Admin Portals

Microsoft 365 Admin Center	https://admin.microsoft.com • aka.ms Old ? Alt
Microsoft 365 Apps Admin Center	https://config.office.com
Exchange Admin Center (EAC) <i>New</i>	https://admin.exchange.microsoft.com
Exchange Admin Center (EAC) <i>Old</i>	https://outlook.office365.com/ecp/
Kaizala Management Portal	https://manage.kaiza.la/
Microsoft Purview <i>compliance portal</i>	https://compliance.microsoft.com
Microsoft 365 network connectivity test	https://connectivity.office.com
Microsoft 365 Network Insights <i>Preview</i>	https://portal.office.com/adminportal/home#/networ...
Microsoft Call Quality Dashboard (Teams)	https://cq.d.teams.microsoft.com
Microsoft Call Quality Dashboard (Lync)	https://cq.d.lync.com
Microsoft Intune Admin Center <i>Endpoint Manager</i>	https://intune.microsoft.com • aka.ms Old ? B2B
Microsoft Endpoint Manager Admin Console <i>Release Candidate</i>	https://rc-devicemanagement.portal.azure.com
Microsoft Endpoint Manager Admin Console <i>Old</i>	https://devicemanagement.portal.azure.com
Microsoft Intune for Education	https://intuneeducation.portal.azure.com
Microsoft Online	https://portal.microsoftonline.com/1WDefault.aspx
Microsoft Store for Business	https://businessstore.microsoft.com
Microsoft Store for Education	https://educationstore.microsoft.com
Microsoft Stream Admin Center	https://web.microsoftstream.com/admin

Modern Attack (you are blind without logging!)



Entra ID - Event Logging

- Every Global Administrator must be familiar with all different Loggings in O365
 - Sign-in logs
 - Apps
 - Risk Users
 -


[Will be huge topic at 13. Webinar \(all about logging in Entra ID\)](#)



Summary

- ✓ With a Guest account a good hacker can gain to Global Administrator within some days (*without Entra ID Hardening*).
- ✓ If you gain hacked and you have O365 in sync you do have two issue (on-Prem, Azure)
 - ✓ With Azure you do have even more headache to get the hacker out of your tenant!
You should adapt your Incident Response Plan for Entra ID
- ✓ Hacker are working on „*how to hack the incident response team*“
- ✓ If the Hacker are on your O365 Tenant no communication is secure before clean-up!
- ✓ Better you spend some time to hardening your Entra ID before it is too late.
- ✓ If you are using Cloud Services with have access to your local environments you must monitor that as well.

teams security





Next Webinar




November
22nd 2023
09:00am



12. Webinar
All about MS CA-Services
by Stephan Emich


Get in contact with us

Philip Berger
Managing Director

 +43(664) 343 8644

 Philip.berger@tems-security.at

Michael Meixner, CISSP
Managing Director

 +43(664) 1453328

 Michael.meixner@tems-security.at